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DID JUSTICE SCALIA HAVE A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION? 
Gary Lawson* 
(forthcoming, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. – (2017)) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
It seems beyond bizarre to ask whether Justice Scalia had a theory of textual 
interpretation. If he did not have such a theory, what were he and his critics talking about for the 
past three decades?  The answer is that they were talking about part of a theory of textual 
interpretation but not an actual, complete theory.  A complete theory of textual interpretation 
must prescribe principles of admissibility (what counts towards meaning), significance (how 
much does the admissible evidence count), standards of proof (how much evidence do you need 
for a justified conclusion), burdens of proof (does inertia lie with acceptance or rejection of a 
proposed meaning), and closure (when is the evidence set adequate to justify a claim).  Justice 
Scalia said a great deal about principles of admissibility and significance, but he said very little 
about the other essential elements of an interpretative theory.  Moreover, much of what Justice 
Scalia said, and much else that can be inferred from his writings, about statutes and 
constitutions concerned theories of adjudication rather than theories of interpretation. The 
relationship between interpretation – the ascertainment of textual meaning – and adjudication – 
the determination of real-world cases – is actually quite complex, even if one has a normative 
theory of adjudication that says to decide cases as much as possible in accordance with 
interpretatively derived textual meaning.  In the end, one probably cannot say that Justice Scalia 
had a theory of textual interpretation.  He came close, however, to articulating a complete theory 
of how to apply statutes and constitutions in adjudication; he was lacking only a clear 
identification of the appropriate standard of proof for resolving legal claims in adjudication. 
 
 
Did Justice Scalia have a theory of textual interpretation for either statutes or the United 
States Constitution? 
The question seems beyond bizarre.  Justice Scalia co-wrote two of the leading books in 
the past few generations on statutory and constitutional interpretation.1  Several of his articles on 
                                                          
*  Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. 
 
1   See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1998), ANTONIN SCALIA 
& BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2896239 
2 
 
constitutional interpretation are modern classics.2  He is widely seen as having moved the 
Supreme Court significantly toward his favored position on statutory interpretation; Justice 
Kagan, for example, said in 2015 that “Justice Scalia has taught everybody how to do statutory 
interpretation differently.”3  Advocates of originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation 
universally see him as quite possibly the most important figure in the development of that 
methodology.4  Justice Scalia certainly thought that he had a theory of interpretation; the word 
“interpretation,” after all, figures prominently in the titles of both of his books.  Indeed, in his 
collaborative work with Bryan Garner, he was deeply critical of J. Harvie Wilkinson’s 
celebration of non-theory,5 and he labelled nontextualist modes of analysis as “anything but fully 
developed theories of interpretation,”6 presumably in contrast to his own fully developed 
interpretative theory.  Whether one calls his method of interpretation textualism or originalism 
(along with whatever qualifying adjectives one attaches to either of those terms), and whether 
one thinks that method is sound or unsound, surely no one doubts that Justice Scalia, perhaps 
more clearly than any other modern – or, for that matter, non-modern -- jurist, had an articulated 
theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation.  If Justice Scalia did not have a theory of 
interpretation, then what exactly was he and his critics talking about for the past three decades? 
                                                          
2   See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989) (showing 1,116 WESTLAW 
references on October 10, 2016); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 
(1989) (showing 1,479 WESTLAW references on October 10, 2016). 
 
3   http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation/ 
 
4   See, e.g., Gary Lawson, On Getting It Right: Remembering Justice Antonin Scalia, 96 B.U. L. REV. 299 (2016). 
 
5   See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 26-27 (criticizing J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY (2012)). 
 
6   Id. at 27. 
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My goal here is to make the opening question seem just a bit less bizarre than it may 
appear at first glance.  It is actually a non-trivial question whether Justice Scalia had a theory of 
textual interpretation, for either statutory or constitutional texts.  To answer that non-trivial 
question, one must focus on two more fundamental questions that all too often lurk unasked 
under the radar: (1) what elements must a theory of textual interpretation possess in order to be 
an actual theory of textual interpretation and (2) what is the relationship, if any, between theories 
of textual interpretation and theories of legal adjudication?  Both questions are quite profound, 
extremely difficult, and far subtler than is often acknowledged. 
In Part I of this article, I will outline the fundamental elements of a theory of textual 
interpretation and see whether Justice Scalia’s position reflects all of those necessary elements.  I 
think it does not, though his seeming competitors (including me) are in no better a position; it 
may well be that no one in contemporary American jurisprudence (including me) actually has a 
bona fide theory of textual interpretation.  In Part II, I will tentatively explore the relationship 
between interpretation and adjudication and see the extent to which Justice Scalia’s views 
connect those two quite different activities.  In the end, I conclude that while Justice Scalia did 
not have a theory of interpretation, he came very close to having a fully developed theory of 
adjudication, though he often conflated adjudication with interpretation, as do many other jurists 
and scholars. 
A great many legal debates are underproductive because participants in those debates do 
not clearly identify whether they are talking about interpretation or adjudication and, if they are 
talking about the former, which elements of a theory of interpretation they are discussing.  An 
examination of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudential legacy provides an excellent vehicle for framing 
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ongoing discussions of both interpretation and adjudication in a more focused and constructive 
fashion. 
 
I. Does Anybody Really Know What a Theory of Interpretation Is?  Does Anybody Really Care? 
 
A theory of interpretation is a theory of meaning.  When one interprets a text, one assigns 
a meaning to that text.  That meaning, in whole or in part, might be thought to be lodged in such 
things as the communicative signals that one ascertains (or thinks that one ascertains) were 
encoded in that text by its maker, in one’s own consciousness or preferences, in some normative 
conception of what a good text would mean in the circumstances at hand, and so forth.  For 
present purposes, it does not matter how one fills in that element of a theory of textual meaning.  
(There are, in fact, right and wrong ways to fill in that element, but that is not my topic here.7)  
My focus for now is on what set of questions anyone, whatever they claim their particular theory 
involves, must either explicitly or implicitly address in order to have a fully functional 
interpretative theory. 
Interpretation implicates the wider category of proof – or, if one prefers, justification.  
When one interprets a text, using whatever methods of interpretation one chooses to employ, one 
is at least implicitly making propositional claims about the text.  To be intellectually interesting, 
those claims must be justifiable in some fashion.  As noted above, those claims might involve 
some externally determined meaning, the contents of one’s own consciousness, some normative 
conception, some mixture of the three, or something else altogether, but interpretation always 
                                                          
7   For some preliminary thoughts on what right and wrong interpretation involves, see Gary Lawson, Reflections of 
an Empirical Reader (Or, Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457 (2016). 
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involves a justifiable claim of some sort.  As such, the interpretative claim is subject to proof.  
The precise form of proof depends on the underlying metaphysics of the claim; one does not 
necessarily prove normative claims the same way that one proves claims about the intentions of 
historically situated individuals, and one does not necessarily prove claims about the intentions 
of historically situated individuals the same way that one proves claims about the hypothetical 
intentions of legally constructed makers of texts.  The key insight is that there is a certain 
universal structure to the idea of proof that provides a framework for any and all specific 
instances of proof, including proof of claims regarding textual meaning.  I develop that insight 
about a universal framework for proof and its implications for legal claims at some length in a 
forthcoming book,8 but a short summary will hopefully suffice for the present essay. 
The proof of any proposition, in any discipline regarding any subject, requires attention 
to at least five elements.  Without each and every one of those five elements, one cannot justify 
claims even in principle. 
First, one must have some means for ascertaining what does and does not count towards a 
right answer.  The law’s formal structure for the proof of adjudicative facts in judicial 
proceedings labels the mechanism for determining what to look for in seeking right answers 
principles of admissibility, and that is an apt term for the more general idea even outside of that 
narrow legal context.  Every inquiry, in any cognitive context, must have principles of 
admissibility that determine what counts as evidence for or against a claim.   Those principles in 
some, and even most, contexts might well resemble an idea of free proof much more closely than 
they resemble the complex and exclusionary evidentiary norms of the American legal system, 
but they must exist in some form.  Even “anything goes” is a principle of admissibility, albeit an 
                                                          
8   GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW: PROVING LEGAL CLAIMS (2017) (forthcoming). 
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unlikely and unhelpful one (because the universe is too vast and diverse to take in as a whole – 
cognition grinds to a halt unless it can narrow its focus in some fashion to some subset of all 
possible facts).  In the context of interpretative theory, principles of admissibility tell you what 
counts for or against claims of meaning.  A textual theory of interpretation will look to different 
things than will a normative theory, and theories that give different roles to different kinds of 
(real or hypothetical) intentions might well have principles of admissibility quite different from 
each other and even more different from the principles that a textualist or normative theory will 
involve.  It is fair to say that a good percentage of the disputes about textual interpretation that 
take place in law and legal scholarship concern different conceptions of principles of 
admissibility. 
Closely related to principles of admissibility are principles of significance. Those are 
norms that tell you how much to count whatever the principles of admissibility tell you to look 
for.  These principles of significance do not have to be well defined.  In the proof of adjudicative 
facts in the American legal system, they are not formally defined at all; the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, for example, recognize that there is something called “probative value,”9 but they 
provide no mechanism for measuring it either cardinally or ordinally.  The broad category 
“rationality” may be all that we have or need to describe these principles of weight or 
significance.  Nonetheless, they must exist in some fashion or no process of cognition can take 
place.  You have to know what kind of evidence to look for, and you have to know what to do 
with that evidence once you find it.  In interpretative theory, many disputes are about 
significance; different theorists can agree, for example, that the subjective intentions of the text’s 
historically real maker are admissible for ascertaining the text’s meaning but disagree about the 
                                                          
9   FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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weight or significance to be afforded that evidence relative to other possible pieces of admissible 
(as determined by the particular interpretative theory’s own norms) evidence of meaning. 
Once you know what to look for and how to evaluate it once you find it, you need to 
know how much evidence is needed in order to justify a claim.  Every act of judgment requires a 
standard of proof that tells you when a judgment is or is not warranted.  That standard could 
range anywhere from “beyond a conceivable doubt” (as Rene Descartes illustrates) to “seems 
right to me” (something akin to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard) to “well, it is not 
wildly implausible” (which is the implicit standard that legal scholars typically employ to 
evaluate their own work while applying something like the Cartesian standard to evaluate 
everyone else’s), but there always must be some standard of proof behind any judgment.  No 
claim to knowledge of any kind, in any discipline, can be evaluated without knowing the 
standard of proof that is appropriate to that kind of claim.  This idea should be completely 
familiar to lawyers.  Exactly the same evidence, weighted exactly the same way, can yield 
different verdicts in criminal and civil cases if the evidence supports a judgment by a 
preponderance of the evidence but does not support a judgment beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Standards of proof directly and profoundly affect the kinds of claims that one can justifiably 
make. 
Once a claim is put forward, does one require evidence of some sort in order to accept it, 
or is the baseline position acceptance of the claim, so that affirmative evidence of some sort is 
required to reject it?  It may seem like a strange question: Why should the bare existence of a 
claim presumptively warrant acceptance of it absent some affirmative reason to reject it?  As it 
happens, it probably shouldn’t; there are good epistemological reasons for asking for some 
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affirmative reason to believe claims before accepting them.10  The point here is only that one 
needs to articulate and identify those epistemological reasons; there is nothing in the bare nature 
of a claim that forecloses a presumptive rule of acceptance.  In a legal context: Does the assertion 
of a claim by a prosecutor operate against a cognitive baseline of guilt or absence of guilt?  How 
about the assertion of a claim of legal meaning by an administrative agency?  The answer 
depends on the operation of the legal system; one can readily imagine systems operating on 
either presumption.  One can usefully call this feature of the proof process the burden of proof.  
The justifiability of claims may well depend on where that burden is placed, though the impact 
of a burden of proof depends quite heavily on the corresponding standard of proof.  If a burden 
of proof must be overcome by evidence beyond a conceivable doubt, it is a significant burden 
indeed. 
Finally, hovering over the entire process of proof is the question of the appropriate 
evidence set.  All decisions are made in light of a specific body of evidence that has been 
assembled in accordance with principles of admissibility and significance.  Is that evidence set 
sufficient to warrant a justified claim about textual meaning?  Nobody can know or have access 
to every possible fact in the entire universe.  It is always possible, in any inquiry, to look just a 
bit longer and more carefully for admissible evidence.  At what point does one know enough 
about one’s small portion of the universe to validate a judgment, given principles of 
admissibility, significance, standards of proof, and burdens of proof?  Put another way, when 
does one stop looking and start deciding?  When do you declare the evidence set closed?  If the 
evidence set is still open, judgment will be premature – or at the very least tentative and/or 
                                                          
10   See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 70 (1992). 
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heavily qualified.  Norms about the proper evidence set vitally shape the kinds of claims that one 
can justifiably make. 
If consideration of any of these elements is absent from a purported theory of 
interpretation, the theory is not actually a theory, in the sense that it cannot justify judgments 
about the text that is being interpreted.  It does no good to have (1) principles of admissibility 
and (2) principles of significance that tell you what to look for and how much to weigh whatever 
you find if you do not also know (3) how much of that evidence is required in order to validate a 
judgment, (4) where the burden of inertia lies, and (5) when it is time to stop looking for more 
evidence and make a judgment.  Similarly, having (3)-(5) does not help much without (1) and 
(2).  All five elements are essential to any act of proof. 
Justice Scalia’s work on interpretation (and I believe that this is true of everyone who is 
toiling in the field today) largely focused on (1) and (2).  Perhaps the most concise and 
informative statement of his methodology appears in Reading Law, his co-authored work with 
Bryan Garner, which identifies “What should you consider?”11 (i.e., principles of admissibility) 
as one of the central questions of the book: 
The interpretive approach we endorse is that of the “fair reading”: 
determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how 
a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the 
text at the time it was issued.  The endeavor requires aptitude in language, sound 
judgment, the suppression of personal preferences regarding the outcome, and, 
with older texts, historical linguistic research.  It also requires an ability to 
comprehend the purpose of the text, which is a vital part of its context.  But the 
                                                          
11   SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 2. 
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purpose is to be gathered only from the text itself, consistently with the other 
aspects of its context. This critical word context embraces not just textual purpose 
but also (1) a word’s historical associations acquired from recurrent patterns of 
past usage, and (2) a word’s immediate syntactic setting – that is, the words that 
surround it in a specific utterance.12 
This brief but potent passage contains a substantial amount of information concerning Justice 
Scalia’s13 principles of admissibility for textual meaning.  It tells us that evidence of how 
historically situated reasonable readers would understand a text is admissible, while evidence of 
one’s own policy preferences is not. It tells us that evidence of textual purpose is admissible for 
ascertaining meaning, but only when that evidence stems from certain favored sources -- 
meaning that evidence from disfavored sources, such as legislative history, is not admissible.  As 
Justice Scalia put it even more explicitly: “[T]he purpose must be derived from the text, not from 
extrinsic sources such as legislative history or an assumption about the legal drafter’s desires.”14  
While this statement of interpretative philosophy is too terse to be considered a full evidence 
code for the subject, it provides enough of a foundation to allow one to make fairly broad and 
confident judgments about how Justice Scalia would regard the admissibility of a wide range of 
offered items of evidence of textual meaning.  Although the existence vel non of principles of 
admissibility is really much more of a continuum than an on-off switch, I am prepared to say that 
Justice Scalia has met the first criterion for a theory of interpretation.  He has a workable and 
                                                          
12   Id. at 33. 
 
13  For ease of exposition, in the text I will henceforth omit references to Bryan Garner when discussing his joint 
work with Justice Scalia.  Admittedly, that is like omitting references to Lennon or McCartney when discussing The 
Beatles, but see the first four words of this footnote. 
 
14   Id. at 56. 
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recognizable theory regarding what one should be looking for as evidence of right answers.  I 
suspect that most of Justice Scalia’s critics and competitors satisfy this criterion as well. 
 The distinction between principles of admissibility and principles of significance or 
weight is far from sharp.  There is no functional difference between saying that something is 
inadmissible and saying that it is admissible but entitled to so little weight that it plays no serious 
role in decisions about right answers.  But principles of significance still matter in any context – 
and I suspect that this is every context – in which one cannot say that every single piece of 
admissible evidence is interchangeable with every other piece.  As long as one can meaningfully 
say that some pieces of evidence are stronger than others, one must be employing some kind of 
principles of significance when making evaluative judgments. 
 I have no doubt at all that Justice Scalia’s account of textual interpretation includes some 
hierarchy of sources and thus contains some kind of principles of significance.  It is not a 
problem for him that there is no real way specifically to identify that hierarchy – just as it is not a 
problem that the law of evidence cannot give more than vague instructions about rationality to 
decision-makers about how to evaluate evidence that the law deems admissible.  “There is no 
precise algorithm available to explain to jurors, or for that matter to historians, anthropologists, 
or astrophysicists, how to connect evidence to organizing theories.”15  Given Justice Scalia’s 
declared object of interpretation – the historically situated public understanding of the reasonable 
reader – and what we know of his principles of admissibility, it is possible to gauge with some 
accuracy how he would at least ordinally rank many items of evidence of textual meaning that 
                                                          
15   Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 413 (1991).  See also William 
Twining, Rule-Scepticism and Fact-Scepticism in Bentham’s Theory of Evidence, in FACTS IN LAW 75 (William 
Twining ed., 1983) (“Wigmore, like Bentham, did not believe that questions of weight should generally be subject to 
formal regulation.  It is fair to say that this view, subject to a few exceptions, is shared by all modern writers on 
evidence.”) (footnote omitted). 
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satisfy his principles of admissibility.  That is enough to satisfy, as much as anything can satisfy, 
the second criterion for a genuine theory of interpretation. 
 Justice Scalia’s articulated writings on interpretation thus allow one to determine for what 
to search when seeking textual meaning and, at least roughly, how to evaluate that evidence once 
one has it.  That is an indispensable part of a theory of interpretation.  It is a good start on a 
theory of interpretation.  It is not, by itself, a theory of interpretation.  A theory of interpretation 
needs at least three more elements. 
 According to Justice Scalia, how certain must one be of an interpretation before one can 
pronounce it correct?  To my knowledge, none of his published works on interpretation 
addresses this question.  That is not surprising.  Almost no one in the law, in scholarship or 
otherwise, addresses the standard of proof for anything other than adjudicative facts.  Indeed, the 
rather stunning absence of any such discussion regarding questions of law started me on a 
mission (some would say obsession) more than 25 years ago to highlight the indispensability of 
standards of proof to any discussion of interpretation, or of anything else that can be expressed in 
propositional form.16  But if Justice Scalia is in good company in not addressing this topic, that 
company consists of people who also do not have genuine theories of interpretation. 
 The best clue to Justice Scalia’s thought on this topic of which I am aware is his 
statement in Young v. United Parcel Service17 that “our task is to choose the best possible 
                                                          
16   I raised this problem of standards of proof for interpretation in the very first article that I ever wrote, see Gary 
Lawson, In Praise of Woodenness, 11 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 21, 24-26 (1988), flagged it as a central question for 
interpretative theory shortly thereafter, see Gary S. Lawson, An Interpretivist Agenda, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
157, 159 (1992), explored it in depth in a subsequent article, see Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U.L. REV. 
859 (1992), and have recently expanded on the inquiry in book-length form.  See LAWSON, supra note 8.  The 
problem continues to be almost universally ignored, including by people who know better. 
 
17   135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015). 
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reading of the law -- that is, what text and context most strongly suggest it conveys.”18  There are 
numerous other cases in which Justice Scalia also invoked the idea of a “best” reading of a 
statute,19 but those cases generally involved deference to an administrative agency under the 
Chevron doctrine,20 in which the Court was determining only whether an interpretation of a 
statute was reasonable, not whether it was correct by any applicable standard.21  The statement in 
Young appeared in a context that did not involve a substantive canon of interpretation that might 
skew the decisional process and thus may be as “pure” an articulation of Justice Scalia’s position 
as we are going to find.  The context of the case, however, suggests caution in affording the 
statement much significance. 
Young involved interpretation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which added to Title 
VII a provision stating: “The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ [in Title VII] 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions 
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected 
but similar in their ability or inability to work.”22  According to Justice Scalia, there are two 
                                                          
18   Id. at 1366 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
19   See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 538 (2009); Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. CIR, 
523 U.S. 382, 389 (1998); Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744-45 (1996);. 
 
20   Many people might, at this point, expect to see a citation to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
Nope.  I won’t do it.  What we know today as the Chevron doctrine owes very little to that decision, to the point that 
it is actually misleading to cite Chevron as support for it.  See Gary Lawson  & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of 
Nothing At All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 
21  For another expression of a standard of proof in the context of a different substantive canon of construction, see 
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2259 (2013) (“If, but for 
Arizona's interpretation of the ‘accept and use’ provision, the State would be precluded from obtaining information 
necessary for enforcement, we would have to determine whether Arizona's interpretation, though plainly not 
the best reading, is at least a possible one . . . . Happily, we are spared that necessity, since the statute provides 
another means by which Arizona may obtain information needed for enforcement . . . . [N] o constitutional doubt is 
raised by giving the ‘accept and use’ provision of the NVRA its fairest reading”). 
 
22   42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
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possible interpretations of the key phrase “shall be treated the same . . . as other persons” in the 
context of pregnancy-related employment actions.   
The most natural way to understand the same-treatment clause is that an employer 
may not distinguish between pregnant women and others of similar ability or 
inability because of pregnancy.  Here, that means pregnant women are entitled to 
accommodations on the same terms as other workers with disabling conditions.  If 
a pregnant woman is denied an accommodation under a policy that does not 
discriminate against pregnancy, she has been “treated the same” as everyone else 
. . . . 
There is, however, another way to understand “treated the same,” at least 
looking at that phrase on its own. One could read it to mean that an employer may 
not distinguish at all between pregnant women and others of similar ability. Here, 
that would mean pregnant women are entitled, not to accommodations on the 
same terms as others, but to the same accommodations as others, no matter the 
differences (other than pregnancy) between them.23 
The statement regarding the “best possible reading” of a statute thus was not made in connection 
with a self-conscious discussion of standards of proof in interpretation.  (Indeed, to my 
knowledge, the Supreme Court has never engaged in a serious discussion of standards of proof in 
connection with textual interpretation.)  Rather, Justice Scalia was objecting to the principles of 
admissibility and significance employed by the majority, which he saw as “craft[ing] a policy-
driven compromise between the possible readings of the law, like a congressional conference 
                                                          
 
23   135 S.Ct. at 1362 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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committee reconciling House and Senate versions of a bill.”24  Nonetheless, his statement about 
the “best possible reading” contains an implicit standard of proof for claims of statutory meaning 
if one tries to universalize it to interpretation in general. 
 Apart from the difficulty of inferring that this cryptic comment represents Justice Scalia’s 
universally applicable view of standards of proof in textual interpretation, there are two problems 
that prevent this implicit standard from filling in that requisite element for Justice Scalia in a 
theory of interpretation. 
First, it is unclear what Justice Scalia meant by “the best possible reading” of a text.  
Does it mean something resembling a “preponderance of the evidence” notion, so that one must 
think an interpretation is more likely than not correct (where “correct” is a function of the 
interpretative theory’s own norms of admissibility and significance) in order to pronounce it 
correct?  Perhaps that is what Justice Scalia meant.  But the context in which he made this 
statement involved a dispute concerning, by his lights, two competing understandings of the 
meaning of a statute.  If the choice is truly binary, then the “best” reading of the statute will of 
necessity be more likely than not correct.  Not all choices of textual meaning, however, are 
binary. Indeed, Justice Scalia said of the majority opinion in Young: “Faced with two 
conceivable readings of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Court chooses neither.”25  That 
means in Young there were at least three offered interpretations of the statute on the table.  To be 
sure, Justice Scalia would place the majority’s offering deep at the bottom of the heap because it 
rests on what Justice Scalia would regard as inadmissible evidence of statutory purpose, but it is 
part of the heap.  And one can surely think of additional candidates for the meaning of the text – 
                                                          
24   Id. 
 
25   Id. at 1361. 
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especially if one is not constrained by the text’s public meaning to the degree that Justice Scalia 
considers himself constrained.  Once one recognizes the possibility of multiple competing 
interpretations of a text, the idea of the “best possible reading” becomes both ambiguous and 
problematic.  Suppose that there are five competing interpretations of a text.  Suppose further 
(though I do not think that this is really possible, but it is helpful as a thought experiment for 
illustrative purposes) that one can assign cardinal probabilities to each interpretation and that 
those probabilities are 24 percent for one interpretation, 23 percent for a second, 22 percent for a 
third, 21 percent for a fourth, and 10 percent for the fifth.  Is the first interpretation correct 
because it is the “best” interpretation?  Even though the chances are better than three in four that 
it is actually wrong by the theory’s own criteria?  Does an interpretation have to meet some 
absolute threshold of reliability, apart from its relative plausibility compared to multiple 
competing alternatives, in order to be correct?  Anyone who proposes a “best possible reading” 
standard of proof has to address precisely what they mean by that standard in any setting in 
which there is not a stark binary choice.  Without that specification, the idea of a best possible 
reading cannot serve as a standard of proof for a theory of interpretation.  And if the standard of 
proof is the weak, purely comparative form of a “best possible reading,” is it really plausible to 
declare to be “correct” answers that one is very confident are wrong?  With a bit of tweaking and 
the addition of many alternative interpretations, the absolute level of confidence that one can 
have in the “best” option in a relative sense can be so low that it makes little sense to call that 
option “correct.”  And if there is an absolute standard of proof instead that any correct 
interpretation must clear, one must specify that absolute standard.  One could try to default to 
something like a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, but one would have to justify that 
default. 
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All of the foregoing work certainly can be done, and indeed all of it must be done in 
order for a fully developed interpretative theory to exist.  My point is only that Justice Scalia 
never filled in this part of his methodology.  Without it, he did not really have a theory of 
interpretation. 
There is an even more basic reason why it would be hasty to treat Justice Scalia as 
adopting a “best possible reading” standard of proof for interpretation: It is far from clear that 
Justice Scalia in Young was talking about textual interpretation at all.  He was talking about how 
to decide a case.  I will say more about this fundamental distinction in Part II. 
What about burdens of proof?  Did Justice Scalia articulate a position regarding the 
default viewpoint for claims of textual meaning?  I am not aware of any such articulation, but I 
have no reason to think that Justice Scalia would adopt anything other than the epistemologically 
sensible view that existence-affirming propositions require positive evidence in order to warrant 
acceptance.  It is not difficult to slot such a view into his approach to satisfy that formal element 
of an interpretative theory, thereby giving Justice Scalia three out of four so far.  While that 
might be even better than Meatloaf and Jim Steinman could muster, a theory of interpretation, in 
order to be a theory of interpretation, must go five for five. 
That leaves the construction of the evidence set as the remaining element of a fully 
functional interpretative theory.  How does one know when one has looked enough for evidence 
of interpretative meaning, however that evidence is defined by the relevant principles of 
admissibility and significance, to justify making a judgment in light of the specified standard and 
burden of proof?  To my knowledge, Justice Scalia never addressed this question in the context 
of interpretation, though he showed an acute awareness of the problem in the context of 
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adjudication.26  That is not surprising.  I am not aware of any significant discussion by anyone, in 
any context, that specifically deals with the construction of an evidence set for textual 
interpretation.  I have certainly never spelled out any norms for such an enterprise.  Without such 
norms, however, one cannot have a theory of interpretation.  One can have a framework for a 
theory of interpretation, or a really good start towards a theory of interpretation, but one cannot 
actually have a theory of interpretation.  All five elements – principles of admissibility, 
principles of significance, standards of proof, burdens of proof, and principles of closure (as one 
might call the principles for fixing the evidence set) – are essential to the formulation of anything 
that can be called a right answer to any inquiry. 
Perhaps, however, one can construct a set of principles of closure from some of Justice 
Scalia’s remarks.  In 1983, while a court of appeals judge, Justice Scalia wrote that “[t]he 
premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of 
legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by 
the parties before them.”27  This suggests a mechanism for constructing evidence sets: Let the 
parties to a case construct whatever evidence sets they like and then decide based on those 
evidence sets.  Of course, Justice Scalia did not universally endorse a fully party-centric view of 
the process of constructing an evidence set.  Elsewhere he said: “I must acknowledge that the 
basis for reversing the Court of Appeals on which I rely has not been argued by the United 
States, here or below. The rule that points not argued will not be considered is more than just a 
prudential rule of convenience; its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, distinguishes 
our adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial one. Even so, there must be enough play in 
                                                          
26   See Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 2, at 860-61. 
 
27   Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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the joints that the Supreme Court need not render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose 
nonexistence is apparent on the face of things, simply because the parties agree upon it -- 
particularly when the judgment will reinforce error already prevalent in the system.”28  So his 
party-centric view was presumptive only.  For present purposes, the relevant question is whether 
this party-centric approach at least allows us to credit Justice Scalia with the fifth element of a 
theory of interpretation. 
The answer is a clear and resounding “no.”  Then-Judge Scalia in this passage was not 
putting forth a method for constructing evidence sets in interpretation.  He was putting forth a 
method for constructing evidence sets in adjudication, which is a completely different matter.  
This fundamental, and too-often ignored, distinction between theories of interpretation and 
theories of adjudication is our next topic. 
 
II.  Next Phase, New Wave, Dance Craze, Anyways, It’s Still Adjudication to Me 
 
When courts decide cases in which parties are arguing about the meaning of statutes, 
constitutions, or other texts, do courts engage in textual interpretation?  Do they do anything 
else? 
The answers are “sometimes” and “always,” respectively.  Adjudication – the 
determination of disputes – sometimes involves statutory or constitutional interpretation as one 
of its component parts, but it always involves, to one degree or another, cognitive endeavors that 
are quite different from textual interpretation.  It is misleading at best to speak of the activities 
                                                          
28   United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted). 
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engaged in by courts, and by scholars who are prescribing outcomes for courts or other official 
bodies, as textual interpretation. 
This observation goes far beyond the obvious fact that courts often self-consciously place 
other values above what they describe as their interpretation of relevant texts, such as when 
courts invoke precedent.  As Justice Scalia put it, “[s]tare decisis . . . is not a part of textualism.  
It is an exception to textualism (as it is to any theory of interpretation) born not of logic but of 
necessity.”29  I am saying instead that when courts (and scholars trying to influence courts) speak 
of the meaning of the relevant texts, they are not generally referring to meaning derived from 
interpretation.  They are referring to a very different kind of meaning, which we might call 
“adjudicative meaning,” which is a meaning – which the judges themselves might well recognize 
as interpretatively false -- postulated for the purposes of deciding a case. 
Interpretation is a positive, descriptive enterprise that involves the ascription of meaning 
to a text. Even when the underlying theory of interpretation contains normative elements, such as 
a theory (however implausible it may be as a theory of interpretation) that says that statutes or 
constitutions mean whatever a good moral theory says that they should mean, claims about the 
meaning of texts grounded in those theories are positive, descriptive claims about meaning.  
What kinds of materials and arguments one needs to prove those claims is a quite different 
question from the characterization of the claims themselves, and it is important to keep those 
ideas distinct.  It is a purely factual question, for example, whether a particular interpretation of a 
text maps onto a particular moral theory, if for some reason one considers that correspondence 
relevant for ascertaining interpretative meaning. 
                                                          
29   SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 413-14. 
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Adjudication, by contrast, is a normative enterprise.  Assuming that there is some actual 
stake to the process, the adjudicator is deciding what behaviors will be permitted and how 
resources will be allocated, with the decision backed up by officially sanctioned force if 
necessary.  Adjudication is about deciding what one should do and what one thinks other people, 
including people with guns and badges, should do.  Because adjudicative decisions are always 
normative, they can only be defended through normative arguments.  All questions about what 
judges, enforcement agents, legislators, citizens, non-citizen aliens, etc. should do are questions 
of moral and political theory.  Accordingly, they are outside the bounds of interpretative theory – 
and I would say outside the bounds of legal theory altogether, though that last view rests on the 
empirical, and I suppose contestable, premise that legal theorists are very unlikely to have 
anything intellectually interesting to say about moral and political theory. 
Interpretation of texts may or may not have much to do with adjudication.  Descriptively, 
it is an empirical question how much of a role interpretative conclusions play in adjudicative 
decisions.  Normatively, it is a question of moral and political theory, not interpretative theory, 
how much of a role they should play.  Interpretative theory can tell you what a text means.  It 
cannot tell you what, if anything, to do with that meaning once you have it or whether obtaining 
that meaning is a worthwhile enterprise given the opportunity costs.  It is certainly possible to 
have a normative theory of adjudication that says to decide all matters in accordance with 
interpretatively derived meanings.  One would have to come to such a theory through application 
of moral and political theory; it cannot be reached through the interpretative theory itself.  As it 
happens, no one, including Justice Scalia, actually has such a normative theory of adjudication 
that relies exclusively on interpretatively derived meaning.  Everyone, including Justice Scalia, 
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balances off interpretative truth , as determined by each person’s own methods of interpretation, 
against other adjudicative goals, such as finality, certainty, consistency, legitimacy, and so forth. 
In the pages of this law journal, Steve Calabresi and I have demonstrated that Justice 
Scalia consistently traded off a substantial measure of interpretative truth – and by this I mean 
interpretative truth that Justice Scalia would likely have regarded as truth – for other values, such 
as constraining judges by deciding cases in accordance with relatively clear rules.30  Over a non-
trivial range of cases, Justice Scalia preferred false but rule-like answers over true but standard-
like ones.  And he did not cast this activity as an exception to textualism, as he did with 
precedent, but as part of the application of that textualist methodology in the specific context of 
adjudication.  What Justice Scalia called his theory of interpretation was chock-full of non-
interpretative policy choices. 
Every theory of adjudication contains some such set of tradeoffs between interpretative 
truth and other values.  How many resources does one devote to ascertaining interpretative truth, 
as that truth is defined by one’s own interpretative methods?  If the answer is less than infinite, 
one is almost certainly trading off some measure of interpretative truth for some other value.  No 
sane person deciding cases in the real world pursues interpretative truth without regard to costs.  
“Anyone who says that there is no price tag on justice understands neither price tags nor 
justice.”31 
To be sure, as I noted above, it is theoretically possible to have a normative theory of 
adjudication that says to decide all cases in strict accordance with the meaning of a particular 
                                                          
30   See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 
(2014). 
 
31   Gary Lawson, Guy I. Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 
94 B.U. L. REV. 415, 446 (2014). 
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text, as that textual meaning is ascertained through descriptive interpretative theory.  It is just 
that such a theory is entirely impracticable in the real world, for several reasons.  One is the 
already-mentioned problem of costs.  In the real world, decisions take place in limited spans of 
time.  One simply does not have the luxury of spending as much time and money as one would 
like figuring out the right interpretative answer.  That is as true, with differences of degree only, 
for ivory-tower scholars as it is for Supreme Court justices who need to complete their opinions 
by July 1.  A scholar who keeps researching rather than publishing will lose both income and 
reputation; for good or ill, published wrong answers are more highly valued, by deans and 
colleagues alike, than inchoate, unpublished, still-developing right ones.  People seeking 
interpretative answers need short-cuts that allow decisions to be made in the face of uncertainty 
caused by incomplete evidence sets, lack of clarity about the application of principles of 
admissibility and significance, and the like. 
A second, equally important problem with basing adjudication strictly on interpretative 
truth is the ability of real-world actors to apply interpretative theories correctly.  Interpretative 
theories yield interpretative truth, as defined by their own internal norms, if, but only if, they are 
applied correctly.  But what if one can reliably predict that real-world adjudicators are going to 
misapply those theories over some range of cases – and possibly over quite a large range?  Could 
it be “better,” by the lights of one’s own interpretative theory, to instruct those fallible 
decisionmakers to apply some other method that imperfectly proxies your favored interpretative 
theory?  In other words, could it be the case that you will better pursue interpretative truth, as 
you understand it, by deliberately fostering error in the search for it? 
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There is no general answer to this last set of questions, because it implicates problems of 
second-best that are quite possibly intractable.32  One would also need a thorough account of 
error, as different kinds of errors might result from different methodological approaches, and not 
all errors are necessarily created equal.  It is enough for now simply to note the questions, as they 
show that there is not necessarily a straight line from theories of interpretation to theories of 
adjudication, even when one’s normative theory of adjudication tries to draw one.  It is not self-
evident that one will prescribe one’s favored theory of interpretation as a theory of adjudication.  
Formulating those different theories requires different cognitive processes, disciplines, and 
bodies of information. 
The relationship between interpretation and adjudication, even as an ideal matter, is 
decidedly contingent.  One could well believe, for example, that some species of originalism is 
the correct way to ascertain the meaning of the United States Constitution but believe, on 
normative grounds, that courts should instead decide cases in accordance with the political 
platform of the liberal wing of the Democrat Party because one thinks that it will yield morally 
better results.  Similarly, one could believe that originalism is a terrible way to ascertain 
constitutional meaning but a wonderful way for courts to decide cases because it places just the 
right constraints on fallible decisionmakers and thus yields morally better results.33  The same is 
true of statutory interpretation: How one thinks meaning is best ascertained does not lead 
inexorably to a view of how courts should decide cases.  There are a great many intermediate 
                                                          
32   For a brief exploration of second-best problems in the context of legal theory, see LAWSON, supra note 8, at Ch. 
5. 
33   See Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism and the Limits of legal 
Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1555-56 (2012). 
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steps between those two conclusions.  It would actually be close to miraculous if they connected 
up precisely. 
Virtually all of Justice Scalia’s writings have been directed towards articulating a theory 
of adjudication, not a theory of interpretation.  He was instructing judges, and indirectly lawyers, 
about how to decide cases.  Accordingly, his instructions on how to construe texts were not 
really designed to interpret those texts, in the sense of finding their meaning as accurately as 
possible, but were instead designed to provide instructions on how to decide cases.  A quick look 
at his theory of adjudication makes this very clear. 
Jack Balkin has written that that “[c]oncerns about legitimacy underwrite theories of 
constitutional interpretation . . . [and] we argue for or against different theories of constitutional 
interpretation in terms of their effects on legitimacy.”34  That is an accurate description of, at the 
very least, a good portion of both academic and judicial writings on constitutional law.  
“Legitimacy” might or might not be related to interpretative truth, depending on what one means 
by “legitimacy,” but it is at least conceivable that a focus on legitimacy necessitates some non-
trivial trade-off of interpretative truth in order to reach the goal of legitimation.  On this broad 
point about the role of legitimacy in constitutional law, Justice Scalia was entirely aligned with 
Professor Balkin.   Justice Scalia wrote in 1989: “I take the need for theoretical legitimacy 
seriously, and even if one assumes . . . that the Constitution was originally meant to expound 
evolving rather than permanent values, . . . I see no basis for believing that supervision of the 
evolution would have been committed to the courts.”35  In other words, courts should be 
pursuing legitimacy rather than interpretative truth.  To be sure, Justice Scalia believed that his 
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legitimating originalist method also reasonably approximated interpretative truth across a broad 
range of cases; I doubt whether he would have advocated a legitimating theory that was utterly 
unremoved from what he regarded as correct interpretation.  But he was quite prepared to trade 
some measure of interpretative truth for some measure of legitimacy in at least some contexts.  
This accounts for his strong adjudicative preference for rule-based decisions, even when truth-
seeking interpretation leads one to relatively mushy and difficult-to-apply standards.36  Indeed, 
Justice Scalia’s whole defense of originalism as a method of interpretation appears to have been 
grounded more in a consequentialist account of judicial role than in the kind of theory of 
concepts and communication that would be necessary in order to validate an interpretative theory 
committed to ascertaining meaning.37 
We can now see how Justice Scalia has a near-fully developed account of adjudication 
that does not translate directly, or even easily, into a theory of interpretation.  Justice Scalia, we 
have noted, identified principles of admissibility and significance for statutory and constitutional 
meaning, reflected in his notion of a “fair reading” of the relevant text.  The bulk of Reading Law 
consists of a series of rules for reaching fair readings.  At least some of the most important of 
those rules are geared to the decision of legal cases rather than to the ascertainment of 
communicative meaning.  Sometimes this gap is openly acknowledged, as when Justice Scalia 
recognizes that “[m]any established principles of interpretation are less plausibly based on a 
reasonable assessment of meaning than on grounds of policy adopted by the courts.”38  
Sometimes the gap is subtler and is found only in the explanations given for various 
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37   See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 25-25, 402. 
 
38   Id. at 30. 
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interpretative principles.  For example, when defending original meaning against so-called 
“dynamic” modes of interpretation,39 it would be sufficient as a matter of ascertainment of 
meaning to point out that communicative meaning comes from the communicator and that it 
therefore presumptively must be original meaning, although subject always to the possibility that 
the communicator intended for meaning to be ascertained in a dynamic fashion, so that fixed-
meaning originalism as a theoretical matter could lead to dynamic interpretation as an 
operational matter.40  There is a brief nod to this kind of argument in Reading Law,41 but it is 
incomplete (because it does not contain the acknowledgment that original meaning might itself 
sometimes call for dynamic interpretation), and it is followed by a much longer, and obviously 
more important to Justice Scalia, discussion of the democratic role of judges and legislators, 
which leads to a categorical rejection of dynamic interpretation on adjudicatory-based 
consequentialist grounds.42  Justice Scalia’s apparent principles of admissibility and significance 
for interpretation are really principles of admissibility and significance for adjudication.  The two 
sets of principles are not necessarily the same, as they are not aimed at the same ends.  How one 
ascertains meaning and how one prescribes decision-making methodologies for courts are two 
distinct enterprises. 
                                                          
39   See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994). 
 
40   Similarly, all meaning must ultimately be grounded in the intentions of a communicator, but oftentimes the 
communicator’s intention is to set forth utterances that will be interpreted in accordance with some kind of public 
meaning.  Intentionalism can lead, operationally, to a theory of public meaning.  This is actually the correct account 
of constitutional and statutory interpretation, but that is a topic for another time.  See Lawson, supra note --. 
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Justice Scalia also has a fairly extensive set of burden-of-proof rules to recommend to 
legal decisionmakers, ranging from the rule of lenity43 to the constitutional avoidance doctrine.44  
Here it is quite clear that these are norms of adjudication, not attempts to discern actual 
communicative meaning.  They are grounded in adjudicative policies and a normative 
conception of the role of courts in the American legal system, not on a theory of concepts and 
communication as would be required for a theory of communicative meaning. 
With respect to the construction of an evidence set, we can now return to Justice Scalia’s 
judicial writings on the subject, which were noted earlier.45  In adjudication, Justice Scalia 
generally, but not universally, regards the evidence set as the materials provided by the parties, 
supplemented at unspecified times by the independent research of the judge.  That is perhaps not 
the clearest or most elegant method for constructing evidence sets for statutory or constitutional 
cases, but it is a method.  It is also tailored uniquely to the adjudicative context.  It is grounded, 
first of all, in a conception of adjudication that is party-centered rather than inquisitorial.  
Second, it is obviously designed to facilitate timely and efficient disposition of cases rather than 
to ascertain communicative truth.  Third, it is not a method that can be prescribed universally for 
truth-seeking, because there will not always be parties available to provide materials (imagine an 
ivory-tower academic trying to figure out the communicative meaning of a statute), and even 
when there are such parties, there is no reason to think that they are likely to provide an optimal 
evidence set.  Thus, while Justice Scalia had a method for closing evidence sets in adjudication, 
he never really addressed the problem of closing evidence sets in interpretation more generally. 
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Thus, much of Justice Scalia’s theory of “interpretation” is not really a theory of 
interpretation, understanding interpretation as the process of discerning the communicative 
content of a text.  It is a theory about how to decide cases in the context of a specific legal system 
oriented around specific and contingent assumptions about the nature of dispute resolution.  
Certainly that is true of much of his account of burdens of proof and the construction of evidence 
sets, and it is true to a significant degree of his account of principles of admissibility and 
significance. 
None of this, I think, would have been at all surprising to Justice Scalia.  After all, the 
working definition of interpretation in Reading Law, drawn from a 1900 legal encyclopedia, is 
“the ascertainment of the thought or meaning of the author of, or the parties to, a legal document, 
as expressed therein, according to the rules of language and subject to the rules of law.”46  
Justice Scalia was not really trying to set forth a methodology for interpreting texts, or even for 
ascertaining the meaning of distinctively legal texts.  He was setting forth a methodology for 
resolving legal disputes in which texts are invoked by one or the other party.  Meaning plays a 
role in that methodology, but the role is far from exclusive, and it is often decidedly secondary.  
To describe the operations involving texts in that adjudicative enterprise as “interpretation” 
invites the fallacy of equivocation.  One can certainly use the word “interpretation” to mean 
those operations, just as one can use the word “interpretation” to mean any operation that one 
likes, from the normative prescription of courses of action to the reading of cattle entrails.  But 
one must then avoid switching meanings, or connotation, of the term “interpretation” in mid-
argument.  “Interpretation” for purposes of deciding cases is not necessarily “interpretation” for 
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ascertaining the meaning of texts, and one must be careful to keep those quite different 
understandings of “interpretation” distinct.47 
Does that mean that Justice Scalia has a fully articulated theory of adjudication, even if 
he does not have a fully articulated theory of textual interpretation?  Not quite.  The one element 
that is not really ascertainable in Justice Scalia’s adjudicative theory is the standard of proof.  
How clear does meaning have to be in order to justify a decision in favor of one or the other 
party?  I am aware of no general answer to that question in Justice Scalia’s writings, even in the 
adjudicative context, just as I am aware of no general answer to that question in the writings of 
any prominent jurist or scholar.  The American legal system (and the same seems to be true of 
other legal systems as well, from what I can glean) has never squarely faced the problem of 
identifying a standard of proof for questions of law or for questions of meaning more generally.  
But that is a story for another time. 
The moral of the story is simply one of clarification: When one speaks of Justice Scalia’s 
theory of interpretation, one is probably speaking of his theory of adjudication instead.  Neither 
theory was actually a complete theory, though the adjudicative model needs only a specification 
of a standard of proof for completeness.  More generally, when one argues about interpretation in 
a legal context, there is always the question whether one is arguing about interpretation 
(meaning) or adjudication (normative theory).  And if one is arguing about interpretation 
(meaning), there is always the question whether one is arguing about admissibility, significance, 
standards of proof, burdens of proof, or evidence sets (or any or all of the above).  Justice Scalia 
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contributed enormously to clear thinking about most of these topics, even if the answer to the 
question at the beginning of this article ultimately proves to be “no.”  
 
